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Article 7

RECENT CASE NOTES
not made in the course of any business but was contained in a reply to a
letter from the plaintiff asking for a letter respecting his services while in
the defendant's employ as captain of a certain vessel.
In Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp., (1925) 208 N. Y. Supp. 625, the doctrine laid down in the Ogilvie case is again approved and followed citing
that case and Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Jones. But an opinion was handed
down on June 21, 1930 in the case of Ostrowe v. Lee, 244 N. Y. Supp. 28,
holding that the dictation of a defamatory letter to a stenographer in the
instant case was an actionable publication" and saying that the Ogilvie and
Belstrat Hotel Cases constitute an exception to the rule that dictation to
a stenographer is a publication, for the reason that the defamer in those
cases were corporations.
The rationale of the more liberal cases seems to be that dictation of
defamatory matter to a stenographer is a reasonable and ordinary course
of business, and for this reason (1) is a publication, but (a) is itself privileged if addressed to the person defamed, (b) is within the privilege if
addressed to one between whom and the defamed there is a privilege; (2)
is not a publication at all (a) if written by a corporation, (b) if written
to the person defamed, or (c) to one who is privileged to receive the deS. J. S.
famatory letter.
EviENc--Res Gestae-RELEVANcY-A truck driver alleged to have
been driving negligently struck the plaintiff while making a delivery for
his principle. The statements of the driver made immediately after the
accident were admitted by the lower court in answer to the question"What was the first statement made by Mr. Van Strohn immediately after
the collision?" The defendant moved to strike out the following answer
as not a part of the res gestae: "Don't call the police; we are covered by
insurance; I have two deliveries to make-I am late." The trial court refused to strike out the statements and the defendant appeals. Held, the
answer should be stricken out. The statement does not throw light upon
the facts of the collision and it does not measure up to the requirements
of res gestae. Red Star Yeast Co. v. Shackleford, Appellate Court of Indiana, May 2, 1930, 171 N. E. 302.
The answer to be a part of the res gestae must be spontaneous, nonself-serving, and made approximately at the time of the accident. Harrison
v. U. S., 200 Fed. 674, 119 C. C. A. 78; Louisville Ry. Co. v. Buck, 116 Ind.
556, 19 N. E. 453. The least evidence of narration or fabrication will exclude the statements as a part of the res gestae. Stephenson v. State, 110
Ind. 358, 11 N. E. 360. Chicago Division Ry. Co. v. State, 128 Ill. 545.
Does the statement of the witness in the principle case show that it is
fabricated, self serving or reasoned? The statement when examined shows
plainly that it is a reasoned one. It was made for the purpose of persuading the plaintiff or others near the accident to allow the driver to continue
upon his deliveries without delay. It was spoken with design. Louisville
Ry. Co. v. Bnck, 116 Ind. 556, 19 N. E. 453. And should therefore be
stricken. People v. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148, 76 Pac. 893; People v. Williamns, 127 Calif. 216, 59 Pac. 581.
But the action before the court was one for damages alleged to have
arisen out of the negligent acts of defendant's agent, who made this statement in question. Can the assertions of the agent be said to aid in deter-
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mining whether the agent was negligent; did it illucidate the point in
controversy? It appears that the statement does not aid in the determination of the facts of the collision. Hence, the statements are irrelevent in
determining the point in controversy in this suit. Gose v. True, 197 Iowa
1094; 198 N. W. 528; Home Insurance Co. of N. Y. City v. Marple, 1 Ind.
App. 411, 27 N. E. 633, 635; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. and 1. G. N. Ry. Co.
v. T. B. Collier, 62 Tex. 318; Ward v. Linnerman, 201 Ky. 131, 255 S. W.
1036. Statements which do not illucidate or explain the point in controversy are irrevelent and inadmissable even if a part of the res gestae. Lund
v. Inhabitants of Tyngsborough, 9 Cush (Mass.) 36.
J. B. E.
HUSBAND AND WIFE--ToRTs--ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND FOR
LIBEL-P married D in 1893. In 1899 the parties separated under a deed of

separation and from then on lived apart. In 1929 P saw on a tombstone
in a churchyard an inscription to "Jennie (another woman) the dearly beloved wife of (defendant)." P sued D for libel. Held, that, though the inscription was capable of defamatory meaning, the P, by reason of sec. 12
of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, could not sue her husband on
it, the action being for a tort and not for the protection and security of
her separate property. Ralston v. Ralston, (1930) 2 K. B. 238.
By the common law a wife could sue her husband on apparently only
one occasion, namely, if he levied a fine in her name; Co. Litt. 133, a. n.
4., and this disability continued into modern times until the rights of
women were enlarged by the Married Women's Acts. The reason why a
wife could not maintain an action against her husband was that the husband and wife were one person Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436 (1876).
The court in the principal case laid down the doctrine that under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, every woman shall have in her own name
against all persons, including her husband, the same civil remedies for
the protection and security of her own separate property, as if such property belonged to her as a feme sole, but that no husband or wife could sue
the other for a personal tort. Remedially and Proceedurally the statutes
dealing with the rights of married women may be classified in seven general
groups: (1) those which deal with property and are silent as to remedies
(2) those which permit a married woman to sue or be sued only in respect
to property which constitutes her separate estate (3) those which expressly
exclude or refuse to authorize suits between husband and wife (4) those
which do not permit a married woman to sue or be sued by a third person
alone in her own name for personal torts (5) those which permit a married
woman to sue separately for tort committed against her (6) those which
in terms permit suits by and against married women as though they were
sole (7) those which in terms permit suits between husband and wife.
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
p. 1037. The rule reached by the weight of authority is that a married
woman may sue her own husband, if necessary for the protection and security of her own separate property; but otherwise actions for a tort between husband and wife cannot be entertained. That is a wife may sue her
husband in an action which under the old forms of pleading would have
been trover for the recovery of her goods, or for a trespass or nuisance to

